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he movement of people across borders has risen significantly over the last few 
decades. According to the United Nations (2015), the total population of 
international migrants has more than doubled since the year 2000 to about 244 
million by 2015. The scale of international migration makes it a global phenomenon. In this 
context, public opinion on migration is usually seen as a valuable barometer of the salience that 
citizens attach to this issue (e.g., Bélanger and Meguid 2008) and of the level of openness of 
native populations toward the arrival of foreign-born individuals. While the broader public is 
usually rather skeptical of immigration and migration influx (e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 
2005; Abou-Chadi 2016), growing concerns about immigration have in fact contributed to the 
recent success of reactionary nationalist parties at local and national elections in Europe (Davis 
and Deole 2017). 
In many European countries, anti-immigration rhetoric continues to resonate with voters and 
there is evidence that a larger number of migrants and refugees is associated with more 
radicalization and far-right voting (e.g., Dinas et al. 2018; Hangartner et al. 2018). Even in a 
country with historically very open borders such as Sweden, a sudden shift in public opinion in 
the autumn of 2015 translated, “seemingly overnight,” into a significant reduction in the number 
of new immigrants, restrictions to existing immigration policies, and the deportation of a record 
number of people.1 Thus, public sentiment toward immigration can influence which parties 
assume power, they shape states’ legislative outputs, and they affect the way immigrants are 
integrated into receiving communities (see, e.g., Meyers 2000; Money 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016; 
Koopmans and Michalowski 2017; Helbling and Kalkum 2018). As such, a comprehensive 
                                               






understanding of how and by which factors public opinion on immigration is formed is crucial 
for the effective design of immigration and integration policies.  
We focus on the impact of terrorism on immigration attitudes across Europe and, more 
specifically, whether terrorist attacks can propagate migration concern from targeted countries to 
their neighbors. This is a highly relevant question. Public opinion and political leaders in Europe, 
including in countries that have not been targeted by terrorists, often link the issue of terrorism to 
migration. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has publicly voiced his fear that more 
immigration is likely to lead to more terrorist attacks, as immigration is a “Trojan horse” for 
terrorists seeking entry into the EU. While it is ultimately elites who make the relevant 
migration-policy decisions, the views of the public matter greatly. Recent research demonstrates 
that public opinion positively correlates with policy outputs (Boswell et al. 2019). Politicians, 
assumed to be office-seeking and interested in retaining power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005), 
take into account citizens’ concerns about political issues, which in turn shapes how the 
government responds with legislative action (e.g., Anderson et al. 2017). It is of secondary 
importance for this mechanism whether the public is “right” about the link between terrorism and 
migration, though: although the public wrongly see a link between migration and terrorism, it 
would still be rational for policymakers to respond to the public for maximizing politicians’ 
chances to remain in power. And migration policies, as the output elites produce, are unlikely to 
be an exception here. 
In 2017, London, Manchester, and Barcelona became some of the latest major European 
targets of terrorism. Earlier attacks in Nice (2016), Paris (2015), and those in Brussels, Berlin, 
and other cities before have turned terrorism into a central issue for the broader public and 





immigration as the primary public issue in 2016, before economic concerns,2 whereas recent 
surveys suggest that negative sentiment toward immigrant populations has become more 
common.3  
As immigrants are increasingly seen as a threat to national security and identity, recent studies 
find that the odds to regard immigration as a problem increases with their likelihood to describe 
terrorist attacks in the same way (Crabtree and Kluch 2017). This is more than just a correlation. 
Analyzing the Bali attack in 2002, Legewie (2013) argues that there is a causal link between 
terrorism and the perception of immigrants across countries, although there is considerable 
variation in both the magnitude of the effect and its temporal duration. As of yet, however, there 
are no studies that systematically identify the spatial dynamics of these processes, across a large 
number of terrorist attacks and locations, and for a sufficiently long time series. Moreover, 
terrorist attacks come in different forms, and previous studies have overwhelmingly focused on 
the most sensationalist events, with large numbers of victims and unusual media coverage. The 
majority of terrorist events is of much smaller scale and receives far less attention, although they 
can still exert important influences on public sentiment. Finally, whereas some studies – on the 
9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, the knife attack in the Netherlands in 2004, Bali in 2002, or the 
attacks in France in 2008 – identified effects outside the targeted country (Finseraas, Jakobsson, 
and Kotsadam 2011; Legewie 2013; 2018; Schüller 2016), this is contentious. Finseraas and 
Listhaug (2013), for example, do not find much of an effect of the Mumbai attack in 2008. 
Hence, the average net impact of terrorism on migration attitudes is not straightforward and 
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cannot be identified by studying single cases of terrorist attacks. Rather, it warrants systematic 
and comprehensive analysis, a contribution we intend to make. 
Societal responses to terrorist attacks have a spatial dimension and terrorist events can have 
important effects on citizens’ perception of immigrants beyond national borders. Both 
psychological effects, particularly the perceptions of the immediate act of violence and the 
associated feelings of danger, as well as the perception of immigrants as a threat to safety and 
security to one’s identity group are felt more strongly in countries closer to the targeted state, and 
are exacerbated by heightened media attention to events in the vicinity. As such, we argue, 
residents from less distant countries are more affected by these dynamics and should show 
increased concern with migration in the aftermath of an attack.  
We employ data from the Eurobarometer, which includes questions on Europeans’ attitudes 
toward immigration from 2003 to 2017. The analysis focuses on how terrorism intensifies public 
attention on immigration beyond national borders. We thus use questions related to the salience 
of immigration, i.e., whether people mention immigration as one of the two most important 
issues facing their country at the present time. We estimate spatial models, employing data on 
foreign states’ level of terrorism post-9/11, which are reasonably exogenous for the purpose of 
this study as this information is driven by factors that have no direct link with the timing and 
scope of the interviews. Our empirical results suggest that terrorism, by stimulating emotional 
public responses, affects the salience of immigration within a country, but also diffuses across 
European states and then shapes immigration-salience attitudes in nearby countries. This finding 
is robust across different model specifications (e.g., when including conditional effects or 
additional controls), across single and multiple spatial-variable models estimated using OLS and 
maximum likelihood approaches (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010), or while controlling for a 





factors” (Franzese and Hays 2007, 142). The latter help us to rule out the possibility that what 
appears to be a diffusion process across countries is actually the result of common exposure.  
This research contributes to four important strands of research. Public opinion formation, 
migration, terrorism, and international diffusion. Our work has important implications for the 
understanding of how migration attitudes are formed, and it enhances our knowledge of the 
security implications of migration. While there is some evidence, limited to few specific 
episodes, that terrorist attacks in other countries can influence the public’s view on migration, we 
provide the first systematic evidence that terrorism abroad affects migration attitudes at home. 
Moreover, we show that there is also a direct cross-national diffusion path, which is robust to the 
inclusion of the domestic impact of terrorism in the focal country. In addition, although there is 
little evidence linking migration to recent terror attacks in Europe, our results suggest that the 
connection between concerns over terrorism and migration flows that has been made in the 
public’s mind extends beyond national boundaries and can have a direct impact on political 
attitudes. This result has other important implications for our understanding of the strategic 
utility of terrorism. Terrorist organizations often exploit networks of migrant communities as a 
recruitment pool and to fuel their radicalization (Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Sageman 2004). To 
mobilize prospective members, militant groups like ISIS have explicitly sought to sharpen the 
divide between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Europe, eventually to destabilize the 
region.4 When terrorist violence manages to deteriorate public attitudes towards immigrants and 
                                               
4 See online, e.g., https://tinyurl.com/hqu4khl. While the reference to Muslim-based terrorism here is not meant to 
suggest a conditional or moderating effect, it is nevertheless plausible that some effect along those lines exists. That 
is, the migration-terrorism nexus could be shaped by concerns over Islam, which depend on whether the country has 





provokes anti-Muslim backlash or political discord over immigration, even in historically 
tolerant societies, this strategy appears fruitful. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
our core finding and how this is crucial for policymakers and public institutions alike.  
 
How Terrorism Propagates Migration Concerns 
Previous research has established a link between the exposure to terrorism and citizens’ political 
engagement (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018), as well as more specifically to concerns about 
migration (Hitlan et al. 2007; Van de Vyver et al. 2016).5 We build upon, but also depart from 
these works as we examine whether the effect of terrorism on migration attitudes can travel across 
borders. We contend that a terrorist attack influences migration attitudes not only in the targeted 
country, but also abroad and that surrounding, neighboring states are more strongly affected than 
less proximate ones. These expectations are due to an accrued salience of migration-threat 
perceptions combined with feelings of imminent danger, especially in neighboring countries, and 
are exacerbated by the workings of news media, which emphasize the importance of events 
happening in the vicinity. 
The perception that migration and terrorism are linked is pervasive among the general European 
public, although there is inconclusive evidence to support an objective association between them. 
Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2017) argue that the number of foreigners living in a country does 
not increase the risk of terror more than a rise in domestic population. Bove and Böhmelt (2016) 
find that the total immigrant population of a state is not associated with an increase in terrorism, 
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although high levels of immigration from terror-prone countries can contribute to terrorism 
spreading across borders as terrorists exploit ties among migrants for radicalization.  
Despite lacking evidence on an objective linkage between migration and terrorism, the wider 
public often demands, and politicians then frequently advocate for, stricter migration policies based 
on the risks of transnational terrorism, thus effectively securitizing migration (Huysmans 2006; 
Tirman 2004). Several states have tightened their immigration regimes as a counter-terrorism 
strategy (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2014; Epifanio 2011). Avdan (2014) reports that policy 
tightening with regard to asylum recognition has been most pronounced in directly affected states. 
Even the UN Security Council recommends effective border controls and controls on issuance of 
identity papers and travel documents in Resolution 1373 to prevent the movement of terrorists. The 
threat stemming from terrorism is thus closely linked to migration in the perception of 
policymakers and the general public. 
As a variant of this perception of a migration-terrorism nexus, the link between terrorism and 
migration is often established by reference to migrants of Muslim faith. Concern with migration 
may then partially reflect concern with Islam. With increasing media attention to the Muslim 
population, the term “Muslim” has become an important category for public debate in Europe 
(Feddersen 2015). While other migrant groups are also seen more negatively in the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks (Davis 2007; Hitlan et al. 2007; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009), Muslim 
migrants may be singled out as particularly threatening (Ciftci 2012; Helbling 2013). Terrorist 
attacks in the US (Panagopoulos 2006), the UK (Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, and Vasiljevic 
2016), and France (Goodwin et al. 2017) have led to more negative views of Muslims. We claim 
that this perceived link between migration and terrorism becomes more salient after a terrorist 





be concerned about migration as possible entry point for terrorists given that, from their 
perspective, the source of danger is close. 
When asked about terrorism, citizens can reason about its causes and point to migration as a 
potential driver. However, terrorist attacks can affect migration attitudes also more inadvertently 
through a series of psychological mechanisms. Terrorists intend to intimidate and instill fear among 
a large audience (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011). News about terrorist attacks “remind 
people of their own mortality,” thus triggering death-related thoughts (Das et al. 2009, 458). We 
argue that such feelings of danger and fear do not stop at national borders. In fact, a terrorist attack 
in a neighboring country is likely to heighten such perceptions of imminent danger. This can put in 
motion a psychological process associated with a series of behavioral and attitudinal consequences 
(Janoff-Bulman 1992; Lazarus and Folkman 1984). This process is relevant for migration attitudes, 
since taking distance from perceived out-groups is a commonly identified result of a sense of 
imminent fear. Feelings of danger and uncertainty can induce, for instance, a shift to a more 
conservative political stance and ensuing concern with migration (Bonanno and Jost 2006; Jost et 
al. 2003). Alternatively, they can lead to the defense of one’s worldview, whereby people hold 
more strongly to whatever they identified with before an attack – immigration is usually not such a 
value (Burke, Kosloff, and Landau 2013; Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003). In line with 
this dynamic, several studies, which are generally based on single cases of terrorist attacks, report 
that such psychological processes can raise prejudice and aversion against foreigners and migrants 
(Das et al. 2009; Hitlan et al. 2007; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 
2009; Van de Vyver et al. 2016). 
The 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker, by the Islamist-inspired Mohammed 
Bouyeri provides an interesting case in point. Studies refer to an invariably negative effect of the 





dam 2011) and within the Netherlands (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Das et al. 2009). Al-
so, research points to how different aspects of migration attitudes can be intermingled and affect-
ed simultaneously after an incident, like a threat to one’s identity and security. After the 2004 
murder, respondents were more likely to affirm that immigrants’ religious practices threatened 
the Dutch way of life and that immigrants posed a threat to security (Boomgaarden and de 
Vreese 2007). 
We contend that these psychological processes associated with migration concerns have a 
spatial dimension. National borders will not stop feelings of danger. Imminent danger and uncer-
tainty, which generate the psychological impact on migration attitudes, should be most intensely 
felt in nearby countries (Pfefferbaum et al. 2000; Schuster et al. 2001; Sprang 1999). In addition, 
in-group favoritism may stretch beyond borders, as a terrorist event is likely seen as an attack at 
a wider identity group that goes beyond the national community (Moskalenko et al. 2006). Peo-
ple on the other side of borders, tied to their neighbors by, e.g., frequent exchange, travel, and 
resulting familiarity could strongly identify with those attacked in the bordering country. These 
insights from social-identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) thus point into the same direction of 
heightened emotionality and in-group favoritism, both associated with increased migration con-
cern as mortality salience theory, but suggest that such processes are limited to nearby areas. 
Hence, terrorist attacks are likely to have an effect on migration concerns in neighboring 
states. Residents from more distant countries should be less affected by this psychological dy-
namic, given that feelings of imminent danger and identification are less intense there. Notice 
that strong feelings of danger, group identification, and salience of the migration threat triggered 
by terrorism in nearby nations are interwoven and inform the psychological process of out-group 
hostility jointly. After all, out-groups, like “immigrants” or “Muslims,” are socially constructed 





dy 2015). In other words, the migration-threat perception and feelings of imminent danger are 
both part of the same process linking terrorism abroad with concerns over immigration at home.  
These hypothesized effects on migration concerns are exacerbated by the news media, given that 
media are more likely to report events that occurred in countries closer to their audience. For 
example, Koopmans and Vliegenthart (2011) find that coverage of natural disasters abroad is more 
likely when the event happened in a state with strong economic relations, larger immigrant 
population, and touristic flows to one’s own country. Within Europe, we would expect the effect of 
homophily and social ties to be quite pronounced. Hence, while large-scale terrorist attacks in 
Europe will find thorough media attention across the continent, the occurrence of an average 
terrorist attack will be reported more extensively in neighboring states, thus generating more 
intense feelings of danger and reinforcing the salience of the migration threat there. Therefore, we 
should observe a more elevated concern with migration in the geographic vicinity of the targeted 
country. In sum, we postulate that terrorist attacks lead to more salient migration-threat perceptions 
and feelings of imminent danger, along with heightened media attention in the vicinity of targeted 
countries.6 In line with this dynamic, we seek to test the following hypothesis:  
 
H1:  Terrorist attacks propagate migration concern across borders with larger effects in 
neighboring than more distant countries. 
 
Both our main outcome of interest, migration concern, as well as the key explanatory factor, 
geographic proximity, can be theoretically extended in several directions. First, the process we 
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outline theoretically may well influence other related factors, e.g., immigration legislations, 
particularly those regarding asylum claims and refugees, or the political success of anti-
immigration parties. In terms of the former, as public demands often lead politicians to implement 
new laws to please the domestic audience and retain power (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005), 
terrorism abroad, through its effect on public attitudes towards immigrants, is likely to indirectly 
lead to more restrictive immigration regulations. In terms of the latter, previous research 
demonstrates that terrorism at home increases the support for right-wing parties (e.g., Getmansky 
and Zeitzoff 2014). It might thus not be entirely implausible that terrorism abroad also shapes 
certain parties’ electoral success. To give one additional illustration, which demonstrates the more 
general scope of our argument and underlines that our findings likely broader implications, we 
complement our theory and analysis by offering evidence for a positive association between 
proximity to terrorism abroad and anti-immigration parties’ electoral success at home in Table A.8 
in the supporting information (p.9). Second, proximity can be captured in more than one way and 
the proximity to a terrorist event is not limited to physical distance. On one hand, proximity or 
distance between states and contiguity may affect attitudes through distinct conceptual channels. 
The two are certainly correlated, but there may be differences in how attitudes transmit across 
borders conceptually. To this end, Table A.6 in the supporting information (p.7) focuses on 
distance as opposed to contiguity. On the other hand, commonalities, trust, and familiarity between 
countries are more likely to be observed between culturally proximate societies (see e.g., Gokmen 
2017). In fact, media frames and news coverage of an event also depend on cultural bonds between 
countries (Yang and Chen 2018). As country’s media are subjected to different cultural 





Pellizzaro 2017), we also explore the cultural similarity between societies in Table A.10 of the 
supporting information (p.12).  
 
 




























Note: The variable Immigration Salience captures the percent of the population that listed immigra-
tion as one of the two most important issues.  
 
Data and Method 
We have compiled a unique data set comprising information on public opinion on migration, 
terrorism incidents, and a series of control variables for several European states between 2003 and 
2017. The sample’s country-time coverage is driven by data availability of the core variables of 
interest, most crucially public opinion on immigration. The country-year is the unit of analysis in 
this time-series cross-section data set (N=413 observations). 
Our dependent variable, the public’s attitude toward migration, is based on the Eurobarometer 
survey.7 As of 2003, the Eurobarometer has consistently, and for a sufficiently large set of 
countries, included “immigration” as response option for the following item: “[w]hat do you think 
are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” With a view to 
capturing our theoretical concept as closely as possible and for maximizing country-year coverage, 
we ultimately chose that question for our outcome variable and use it to code the percent of 
individuals who mentioned immigration as one of these two most salient issues. For example, in 
the Eurobarometer survey 62 in 2004, 30.27 percent of the British respondents mentioned 
immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the UK at the present time. For our 
final dependent variable, we first dropped the “don’t know” answers and missing values in each 
item. In a second step, we aggregated this individual-level information to the country level by 
averaging across respondents. Finally, we calculated the average value per country-year in case 
                                               





more than one Eurobarometer survey comprising the item we focus on existed in a given year. We 
thus end up with a variable measuring the public mood toward immigration salience, which 
theoretically ranges in [0; 100], with higher values pertaining to a larger share of respondents 
perceiving immigration as a pressing issue for their country. The item’s mean value is 11.822 
(standard deviation of 10.938) with a minimum of 0.200 and a maximum of 64.157. Figure 1 plots 
the public opinion on immigration as captured by immigration salience for all states included in our 
analysis across the years for which data are available. 
In general, survey data generally comprise two dimensions of attitudes toward immigration, 
i.e., preference and salience (see Hutton 2017, for a thorough). There are two important 
differences. Whereas preferences relate to the level of immigration that the individual would like 
to see, salience is the “intensity of that feeling” and the degree of importance that she attaches to 
immigration as a policy issue (Hatton 2017). In other words, “preference is viewed as evaluative 
while salience is a cognitive dimension” (Hutton 2017, 3). From a policy perspective, voters’ 
preferences do not become political priorities when salience is low. At the same time, highly 
salient issues can elicit strong responses.8 We thus use immigration salience as our main 
dependent variable. 
 Given our theoretical interest in whether terrorism abroad influences public opinion on 
migration at home, we estimate spatial-x models (Franzese and Hays 2007; 2008; Plümper and 
Neumayer 2010, 420f), i.e., we “regress the dependent variable on the values of one […] 
independent explanatory variable.” Hence, a country’s attitude toward migration is in our case a 
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function of foreign states’ level of terrorism, and a weighting matrix specifies which subset of 
countries exerts influence. Using a scalar notation (with i≠j), we estimate, 
yit=a+fyit-1+rSjwijtxjt+bXit+eit,                                                  (1)   
where yit is our dependent variable, i.e., Migration Attitude, and yit-1 is its one-year temporally 
lagged value. X is a set of controls discussed below, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects, 
while a stands for the constant and ɛ is the error term. The spatial part of the first equation com-
prises the product of a connectivity matrix (wijt) and an explanatory variable (xjt), which we dis-
cuss in the following. We estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS), but eventually 
focus on the maximum-likelihood procedure introduced in Franzese and Hays (2007; 2008), 
which “does not assume a temporally lagged spatial lag and addresses simultaneity bias head on” 
(Ward and Cao 2012,1084).9 
We systematically control for countries’ common exposure to similar exogenous (unit-level) 
factors, which – rather than a genuine diffusion process we argue for – may drive attitudes to-
ward migration (Franzese and Hays 2007, 142). Franzese and Hays (2008) suggest including a 
lagged dependent variable, country fixed effects, and time fixed effects to address this. Including 
these items, plus a set of control variables that we introduce below, credibly ensures that conta-
gion “cannot be dismissed as a mere product of a clustering in similar [state] characteristics,” 
i.e., common exposure (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, 230; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 427). 
To this end, the temporally lagged value of migration attitudes allows for path dependencies, 
common trends, and temporal dynamics more generally. Year fixed effects control for system-
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wide shocks such as the 2015 “refugee and migration crisis” in Europe. Finally, country fixed 
effects control for time-invariant, but idiosyncratic factors affecting a state’s public opinion on 
migration.  
Our main focus lies on the spatial variable WxTerrorism. As indicated above, this item is the 
product of a weighting matrix (wijt) and one of our explanatory variables (xjt). First, the weighting 
matrix is based on direct contiguity: using the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data (Doug-
las et al. 2002), the elements in the connectivity matrix capture the contiguity of country i and 
country j as defined by a land/river border or the two are separated by up to 400 miles (643.74 
km) of water (value of 1 in the matrix). If there is no such border between countries i and j or 
elements refer to two different years in the matrix, we assign a value of 0 (and also wi,i=0). We 
focus on contiguity as the interpretation of the results is facilitated when using binary weights in 
the connectivity matrix. That said, our theoretical mechanism mainly concentrates on the prox-
imity between states (e.g., great circle distance between capital cities), which is related to, but 
also conceptually different from, contiguity. As suggested above, contiguity and proximity may 
affect attitudes through distinct conceptual channels. For example, Avdan and Webb (2018) 
show that the public views contiguous “territory” as within one’s neighborhood, which in turn 
affects attitudes toward terrorism. Braithwaite (2013) and Braithwaite et al. (2018) focus on the 
effects of distance on risk perception. To this end, Braithwaite (2013, 97) suggests that “that 
physical proximity to attacks may heighten emotional arousal and personal sense of vulnerability 
in a manner that separates this population from the rest in terms of perceived threat” (emphasis 
added; see also Huddy et al. 2005). Fischhoff et al. (2003, 138) also focus on distance rather than 
contiguity and claim that “those close to attacks may both see and feel more of both components 
of risk: higher probabilities [of attacks] and greater consequences” (emphasis added; see also 





other, but there may be differences in how attitudes transmit across borders conceptually. To this 
end, although we focus on contiguity in the following, we evaluate the robustness of our main 
finding with an indicator based on the distance between capitals in the supporting information 
(Table A.6, p.7). 
Second, the independent variable we use to construct the spatial item is the number of terrorist 
attacks in countries j (i.e., sending states from which the spatial stimulus originates). We rely on 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011, 321), which de-
fines terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national 
groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intim-
idation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.” The GTD codes the number of 
terrorist attacks, domestic and transnational ones, in country-years and we focus on the total 
number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year for xjt. Ultimately, in rows corresponding to 
country i, entries are 0 unless the corresponding state in column j of the weighting matrix is a 
neighbor, in which case the entry is j’s number of terrorist attacks as coded by the GTD. On the-
oretical grounds that apply here, we do not row-standardize the matrix underlying WxTerrorism. 
Row-standardization changes “the relative substantive weight of units from which the contagion 
originates. Without row-standardization, all contiguous countries exert the same influence no 
matter how many contiguous countries there are. After row-standardization, contiguous countries 
exert an influence that becomes proportionally smaller the larger the number of contiguous coun-
tries” (Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 430). In our European context and given the interest in 
whether public opinion may be influenced by terrorist attacks abroad, it seems unlikely that the 
number of neighboring states is of importance, and all contiguous countries should in principle 





In light of the discussion about common exposure, we control for a series of other influences 
that may well be correlated with migration attitudes at the domestic level. Given the spatial-x 
specification of our model, we include Terrorism, a count variable measuring the number of ter-
rorist attacks in the focal country i in a given year. As in the case of the spatial variable, we use 
the GTD (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011). Despite our interest in a transnational diffusion 
effect stemming from terrorism abroad, we still expect this variable Terrorism to be positively 
linked to Migration Attitude. When subscribing to our claim that people, albeit wrongly, link 
terrorism to migration, we should observe the proclaimed effect also at the domestic level, and 
potentially even a stronger impact than in the case of WxTerrorism. 
We also include variables such as the socio-economic status, left-right self-placement, and 
country-level economic and political characteristics that enjoy near-consensus support in the 
literature as main drivers of opinions over immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hain-
mueller and Hopkins 2014). We control for the position of the median voter using Eurobarome-
ter data on respondents’ left-right self-placement on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right) (Schmitt and 
Scholtz 2005). We use Tukey’s method (1977) to calculate the median from the individual level 
data. The more “conservative” or “right” the general public is, the more likely it will be that mi-
gration is seen as salient. In our sample, this variable has a mean value of 5.360 (standard devia-
tion of 0.554). While all countries in our dataset are democracies, we also control for variation 
within this form of government using the polity2 item from the Polity IV data.10 
Finally, we include three variables that are all taken from the World Bank Development Indi-
cators, which are all log-transformed to account for their skewed distributions. First, public opin-
ion on migration may be linked to states’ economic development and we use GDP per capita (in 
                                               





current US Dollars), which is defined as the gross domestic product divided by midyear popula-
tion. Second, population size is likely to be linked to the degree of preference heterogeneity in a 
society, which in turn could affect the public’s views on migration. We rely on a country’s mid-
year total population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship (except 
for refugees not permanently settled). Finally, there is the total population size (or stock) of in-
ternational migrants and refugees living in a country. The World Bank defines the international 
migrant and refugee stock as “the number of people born in a country other than that in which 
they live. It also includes refugees.” Hence, this variable captures the entire population of for-
eign-born individuals in a state. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 summarizes our main models. Model 1 is a “naive” estimation that merely comprises the 
controls, the domestic-level terrorism item, and the fixed effects, but omits the international-level 
spatial variable. Hence, Model 1 neglects that an international diffusion effect stemming from 
terrorism abroad exists that shapes migration attitudes at home. Model 2 changes this perspective 
as we now include WxTerrorism next to Terrorism. We omit the substantive controls, though, to 
demonstrate that our main finding is not affected by their inclusion or exclusion. Models 3 and 4 
constitute our full models (all explanatory variables included). Model 3 is based on OLS, while 
Model 4 is estimated via maximum likelihood using the estimator from Franzese and Hays 
(2007; 2008).  
Interpreting the results in Table 1 requires some additional information. First, as we do not row-
standardize the spatial variable’s connectivity matrix, its coefficient cannot be interpreted directly. 
However, Plümper and Neumayer (2010, 430f; see also Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 39) suggest to 





term spatial impacts. Second, because we include the temporally lagged dependent variable, long-
term effects are larger than short-term effects in the current year. Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 
(2005, 336; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 425) show how the former, asymptotic long-term effects 
can be calculated by taking the temporally lagged dependent variable’s coefficient into account, and 
we follow their approach to estimate both asymptotic long-term effects and short-term effects (Fig-
ure 3). Finally, when including a spatial item in a model, coefficients provide information about the 
pre-dynamic effects, i.e., “the pre-[spatial] interdependence feedback impetus to outcomes from 
other regressors” (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010, 409). To fully understand the direct and indirect 
effects of WxTerrorism, we also present spatio-temporal multipliers, which allow the “expression of 
estimated responses of the dependent variable across all units” (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010, 
409). The corresponding effects are presented in Figure 4. 
 
TABLE 1      Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home? 








Lagged Migration Attitude 0.7107 0.7025 0.7084 0.7087 
 (0.0410) (0.0386) (0.0405) (0.0380) 
Terrorism  
 
0.0653 0.0573 0.0589 0.0597 
 (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0189) 
WxTerrorism  0.0247 0.0259 0.0227 
  (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0072) 
Population (ln) -6.1839  -10.2671 -9.7651 
 (9.9617)  (9.9278) (9.2860) 
GDP per capita (ln) 2.1225  1.6733 1.7285 
 (2.4129)  (2.3883) (2.2359) 
Migrant Population (ln) 0.0705  1.0590 0.9374 
 (2.6088)  (2.5967) (2.4292) 
Median Voter 0.7385  0.7403 0.7401 
 (0.6289)  (0.6213) (0.5818) 
Democracy -0.0956  0.2337 0.1932 
 (1.1069)  (1.0987) (1.0282) 
Observations 413 413 413 413 





Year and Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RMSE 4.3497 4.2960 4.2976 4.0243 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; constant, year fixed effects, 
and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation. 
 
 
WxTerrorism is positively signed and statistically significant across Models 2-4 of Table 1. Add-
ing or dropping control variables or a change in the estimation procedure from OLS to maxi-
mum-likelihood estimation do not affect the robustness of this finding. Thus, we obtain evidence 
that terrorism abroad does influence public opinion on immigration at home, as we contend in 
theoretically. Substantively, we begin with Figure 2 that depicts predicted values of Migration 
Attitude, our dependent variable, for values of WxTerrorism while holding all other variables con-
stant at their mean values. At the minimum of the spatial item, which pertains to no terrorist at-
tacks in neighboring states, our model predicts a value of about 11, i.e., on average, 11 percent of 
the population would indicate that immigration is one of the two most salient issues affecting 
their country. The point estimate of the predicted values increases to more than 16 when raising 
WxTerrorism to its sample maximum (the root mean square error is about 4.30 in Model 3). 
 

















Note: Dashed lines pertain to the 95 percent confidence interval; rug plot along the x-axis illustrates 








Note: Horizontal bars are 95 percent confidence intervals; estimates are based on Model 4. 
 
In addition, a country’s migration attitude would be 0.12 points higher in the short run, if all 
neighboring states would see one terrorist attack (see Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 38). In the long 
run, as demonstrated with Figure 3, the effect increases to 0.41 when the spatial item WxTerrorism is 





variable in the current year, while long-term effects stand for the asymptotic influence, i.e., when 
t goes toward infinity and they can directly be derived from our estimation (Plümper, Troeger, 
and Manow 2005, 336; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 425). To this end, the interpretation of the 
long-term effects is that the impact of incidents in year t strengthens over time. If attitudes ce-
ment over time rather than dissipate, a quasi-permanent shift in the political landscape may 
emerge whereby migration overtakes other issues in terms of policy salience. This seems to be in 
line with what we report above, i.e., that European citizens regarded immigration as the primary 
public issue in 2016. However, there may clearly be different mechanisms and influences emerg-
ing over the years that will drive this result – our asymptotic estimate is based on the covariate 
values observed until the end of the sample period. The substance of these effects is nevertheless 
considerable, clearly showing that an important effect does exist. However, as discussed below, 
the impact of Terrorism is, as expected, larger. While these substantive results are based on 
Model 4, adding or dropping specific variables does not change the findings qualitatively. 
Coming to the long-term equilibrium impacts, i.e., the higher-order effect from the influence 
the number of terrorist attacks of j exerts on its neighbor i, which in turn feeds back into the net-
work and then influences others via direct and indirect links, including i (see also Ward and Cao 
2012, 1092-1094), we focus on the year 2015 for our simulation and hypothetically induce one 
terrorist attack in two states: France and the UK, respectively. These two countries are not only 
the European countries widely regarded as most influential in terms of international diplomacy; 
they have also shared the brunt of the recent rise of right-wing and Islamist terrorist attacks and 
extremism. We then calculate the long-term effects on all states, as the shock reverberates 
through the system of spatial and temporal lags using Ward and Gleditsch (2008, 45), 





where I is the identity matrix, W the sub-matrix of the ith weighting matrix for period t, and DXb 
is the shock at time t. Since each unit will have a different set of linkages to its neighbors, the 
impact of a hypothetical change in xi will depend on which unit is being changed. Hence, we 
capture the combination of direct and indirect effects given direct and indirect links. It is through 
that network of direct and indirect links that information flows. 
 




Note: Entries pertain to spatial long-term equilibrium effects in other countries when simulating 
one terrorist attack in either France (grey diamonds) or the UK (black circles). Direct effects for 
France (3.71) and UK (3.61) not reported to improve readability.  
 
Based on Model 4, Figure 4 summarizes the findings from two experiments for the impact of 





and Sana Ahmed Khan planned to commemorate the anniversary of the July 7, 2005 suicide 
bomb attacks, while the November 2015 attacks in Paris are one of the most severe terror inci-
dents in France’s recent history. We report the median (50 percent) equilibrium impact as our 
calculations are based on 1,000 random draws from the multivariate normal distribution of the 
spatial and temporal lags. The simulations suggest that the proclaimed effect is both significantly 
and substantively important. An induced terrorist attack in the UK in 2015 would positively af-
fect all other countries in the system to the extent that a larger percentage of people would see 
immigration as a salient issue. Not surprisingly, the effect is largest in the UK, though, with an 
increase of 3.61 percentage points of Migration Attitude. Across borders, the effect weakens but 
remains influential: in Germany, France, Belgium, or the Netherlands, our model predicts an 
increase of almost half a unit in public opinion on immigration salience. The effects are similar 
when simulating a terrorist attack in France in 2015. For instance, the German public would react 
to this by increasing its migration attitude by 0.49 units. Similar effects are given for Denmark, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy. 
Linking these findings to our theory, we find strong and robust support for our hypothesis. 
Although most terrorist attacks hardly have any connection to migrants or refugees, the public 
perceives that such a link does exist. This effect is even so strong that it can travel across nation-
al borders, with terrorist incidents in, for example, France crucially influencing the public mood 
on immigration salience in neighboring states. These findings provide important lessons. First, 
public opinion on migration is not only shaped by domestic, unit-level effects, but there are 
transnational-diffusion mechanisms that systematically shape how the public sees immigration. 
Second, this transnational-diffusion effect originates in what people believe is linked to migra-





Finally, the results concerning the control covariates are mixed. On one hand, Terrorism is the 
only substantive control that is linked to statistically significant effects. As we would expect, this 
variable also exerts a positive impact on Migration Attitude, which is also more strongly pro-
nounced than in the case of WxTerrorism. The short-term effect of Terrorism is, for instance, 0.060 
in Model 4, which renders even more support for our underlying theoretical argument that people 
link terrorism and migration, but also shows that the effect weakens off when it has to travel 
across borders. On the other hand, all other control variables are statistically insignificant. We 
believe that this is driven by our conservative approach that likely soaks up the effects of slow-
moving variables in either the fixed-effects or in the lagged dependent variable. Finally, an F-test 
shows that the battery of country and year fixed effects does add to the model fit, and it is partic-
ularly interesting, although not unexpectedly, that the 2015-year dummy exerts the overall 
strongest marginal effect among all explanatory powers as this was the year the migration and 
refugee crisis reached its climax in Europe. 
We probe the robustness of our empirical findings with several additional analyses, which are 
presented and discussed in the supporting information. We address issues of intra-group correla-
tions more effectively by means using clustered standard errors (Table A.1 of the supporting 
information, p.3) and we introduce a Spatial Durbin Model, which adds a traditional spatial lag 
to control for the impact of migration attitudes abroad on public opinion at home (Table A.2, 
p.3). We also evaluate our findings conditional on countries’ population size and economic pow-
er (Table A.3, p.5) as well as on right-wing executive leadership (Table A.13 and Figure A.1, 
p16). We further control for unemployment (Table A.4, p.6) and distinguish between transna-
tional and domestic terrorism (Table A.5, p.6). In light of our argument on media attention, we 
additionally consider other characteristics of terrorist attacks, including the lethality of an inci-





cessful attacks (Table A.11, p.13). Finally, we mitigate concerns regarding simultaneity bias by 
means of three-stage least square estimations (Table A.9, p.10). All analyses in the supporting 
information emphasize that the results carry over and these additional checks increase the confi-
dence in our main result: migration attitudes “at home” are systematically driven by terrorist at-




Over the last years, the increasing frequency of terrorist violence meant that the question of how 
to most effectively respond to terrorism has returned as a central concern for policymakers. Pub-
lic opinion is an important measure of success and influence for terrorist organizations, thus un-
derstanding how public attitudes are formed is fundamental for counterterrorism policies. In this 
article, we focus on attitudes toward immigration. Immigration is a highly debated issue, particu-
larly in Europe where a record 1.26 million migrants, mostly from war-torn nations, sought asy-
lum in 2015. A main issue in the public debate on immigration revolves around the possible se-
curity implications of such population inflows. Whereas the EU and its member states have long 
integrated immigration into their security agenda, Jihadist radicalization and the potential arrival 
of extremist terrorists through legal or irregular immigration routes has become a concern for 
European leaders and their voters. Although in most cases, attacks in Europe have been carried 
out by native-born residents rather than recently-arrived migrants, opinion polls show that many 
respondents link the risk of terrorism to increased immigration.  
We examine the spatial dynamics of this link and ask whether terrorist events in neighboring 
countries affect attitudes toward immigrants. We contend that the perceived relation between 





beyond the borders of a targeted country. Our approach differs from previous studies in that, 
among others, we consider the universe of terrorist events in Europe in the post-9/11 period rather 
than selected emblematic cases. We find that both terrorism at home and terrorism abroad 
significantly increase concerns over migration. Thus, terrorist attacks abroad, particularly those 
from neighboring countries, seem to play an important role in explaining domestic public sentiment 
toward immigrants. As such, the overall effect of terrorism on public opinion about migration is 
even larger than hypothesized by previous studies. 
The “European migrant crisis” has created deep divisions within the EU and has challenged 
its commitment to hosting third-country nationals from war-torn regions. Previous research 
shows that incumbents usually pay a great deal of attention to public opinion and a poor under-
standing of what drives public sentiment, particularly the fear of a migration-terrorism link, can 
lead to dire policy decisions, e.g., more stringent selection and admission requirements, a lack of 
access to long-term settlement and rights associated with the status of immigrants, or the depor-
tation of foreign citizens. In light of potential reforms to the asylum policy within the EU, and 
the way opinion polls shape domestic policies and political reforms, our results suggest a more 
careful consideration of exogenous factors. The effect of terrorism can be felt by citizens abroad, 
even when their country is neither directly targeted nor at imminent risk. 
While our research is based on evidence from Europe, its findings are also relevant for other 
world regions. However, we expect a cross-border diffusion of migration concern as a result of 
terrorism only if three scope conditions are met. First, the terrorist attacks that are at the origin of 
attitudinal change must be sufficiently novel and shocking. Hence, we do not expect our findings 
to travel to conflict countries where terrorist attacks represent repeated occurrences. Second, dif-
fusion of attitudinal change from targeted to nearby countries hinges on some sense of similarity 





grated regions like North America, but not in world areas where neighbors share little common-
alities. Third, the content of attitudinal change – in our context migration concerns – depends on 
the public’s preconceptions. Where citizens commonly believe in a linkage between terrorism 
and migration (despite lacking evidence), we expect to see a similar effect of nearby terrorist 
attacks on migration concern. 
There are several interesting questions to explore in further research. First, future studies may 
identify conditions under which terrorism in another country influences migration attitudes at 
home. In the supplementary materials, we consider diffusion effects from more populous and 
economically stronger states to smaller and economically weaker countries, respectively (Table 
A.3), but other scope conditions seem plausible. Second, given that anti-Muslim sentiment is on 
the rise in many European countries, exploring differences in opinion toward EU and non-EU 
immigrants seems an effort worth making. Third, our core finding for both domestic and transna-
tional paths of influence from terrorism is large enough to be politically relevant. An important 
question is whether this effect may increase in the long-run as the cumulative impact of multiple 
attacks sets in. If anything, then, what explains this strong link that citizens attach to migration 
and terrorism requires more systematic and in-depth research. Finally, public opinion matters for 
policymakers’ decision-making. As discussed, politicians have incentives to respond to public 
opinion via legislative output for maximizing the chances to stay in power. To this end, it may be 
an effort worth making to study how policy outputs and public opinion are related to and influ-
ence each other. These variables may form a system in which each is related to the other – each 
variable is endogenous. Earlier research provides some support for linkages between public opin-
ion and policy output, but assumes that each relationship is unidirectional. By going beyond 





relationships, we will likely further our understanding of how migration attitudes are formed and 
what impact they have. 
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